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Abstract. It is shown that if there is adverse selection on seller's ability
in experience goods market, credible communication can be sustained by rep-
utation motives in spite of the inherent con°ict of interests between sellers
and buyers. In the absence of \commitment" types, reputation motives are
explained as a consequence of equilibrium interplay between the market's per-
ception on a seller's ability to deliver quality and the level of trust it places on
the information he provides. Moreover, reputation motives do not disappear
even after the seller's ability is revealed. This model is applied to examine
the extent to which consumer rating systems may discipline sellers in honestly
informing buyers about the quality of their product. Also analyzed is the im-
pact of the possibility that sellers may restart as new traders by obtaining new
identities. (JEL Codes: C73, D82, D83, L14)
Keywords: cheap talk, consumer rating system, reputation, trust.
1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that reputational concerns help to sustain the trust that
is essential in e®ective transactions of experience goods. The problem of po-
tential ine±ciencies due to hidden information and moral hazard is particularly
acute in service industries and internet markets.1 As an attempt to overcome
this problem, many trading websites adopt consumer rating systems, but their
e®ectiveness is far from proven.2 In light of the rapid expansion of these markets,
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1See Dellarocas (2003 and 2005) and references therein for a discussion of reputation issues
on Internet, and Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2006) for a survey of the literature on seller reputation.
2Various studies ¯nd marginal e®ect, e.g., Jin and Kato (2006). See also a survey paper
by Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) and the references therein. A recent study of eBay data by
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this paper is an attempt to further our understanding of the key factors that
determine the e®ectiveness of reputation mechanisms in market environments.
For a seller of goods or services, reputation can encompass several dimen-
sions. In particular, it re°ects the beliefs on his \ability" to deliver a good/service
of high quality. In addition, it may also re°ect the level of \trust" attached to
the soft information provided by the seller prior to transaction, concerning the
quality, suitability, etc., of the particular item for trade. These two dimensions
of reputation are undoubtedly interrelated.
We present a model that delineates the mechanism and e®ect of this inter-
relation. Since trustworthy behavior implies a short-term sacri¯ce, it is worth
pursuing only if it is expected to bring enough future reward. In an e±cient
market in which sellers are paid according to the expected quality of the items
they deliver, such a future reward can take the form of an enhanced perception
of the market on the seller's ability to deliver high quality, which is typically
referred to as the seller's reputation. Of course trustworthy behavior will lead to
an enhanced reputation only if sellers of high ability behave more trustworthily
than those of low ability, lending an intrinsic link between the two dimensions
of reputation, ability and trust, in market environments.
We show how such a link between ability and trust can emerge endogenously,
steming from the fact that the cost of continuing with trustworthy behavior is
larger for a low-ability seller who anticipates more \bad news" that she will have
to disclose honestly. The incentives of a low-ability seller to mimic the trustwor-
thy behavior of the high-ability sellers for future reputational rent eventually
dissipates, leading to separation of sellers of di®erent abilities which takes place
when a seller's reputation grows above a certain level. Even after separation,
high-ability sellers continue to preserve their reputation by resisting temptation
to cheat.
In this equilibrium, credible communication (of a considerable degree, if not
full) is sustained in spite of the inherent con°ict of interests between sellers and
buyers, owing to the combined e®ect of separation motive of high-ability sellers
and mimicking motive of low-ability sellers. Thus, high-ability sellers are more
reliable in disclosing nonveri¯able information to buyers honestly. We note that
adverse selection on seller's ability is indispensable for our result: If the seller's
ability is publicly known, repeated interactions would not su±ce for any credible
communication to take place, however patient the seller may be. It may also be
worth noting that adverse selection on an arbitrarily small di®erence in ability
is enough to actuate credible communication via reputation motives if the seller
is su±ciently patient.
Cabral and Hortacsu (2008) reports a clear e®ect on sales of the ¯rst negative feedback which
appears to cause more frequent negative feedbacks with smaller e®ects; and it also reports an
increase of negative feedbacks just before exit by low reputation sellers. These ¯ndings are
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At a theoretical level, this paper builds on the reputation literature initiated
by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982),3 with some non-
trivial di®erences. In this literature reputation arises either when an agent
strategically mimics a certain behavior so as to be pooled with agents of another
type who are committed to that behavior (pooling reputation), or when an agent
strategically diverts from a certain behavior so as not to be mistaken for another
type who is committed to that behavior (separating reputation) as in Mailath
and Samuelson (2001). As such, reputational incentives tend to be temporary in
these models because their e®ect vanishes once the agent's type is revealed (e.g.,
by cashing in the reputation),4 unless the agent's type is subject to continual
random changes for reasons like ownership changes.
In our model, reputation arises from the presence of adverse selection on
seller's ability (in supplying good quality items), without the existence of a
\commitment" type. In particular, both types of sellers are strategic and have
con°icting interests with the buyer; however, the more reliable type (in delivering
quality) always behaves trustworthily in equilibrium, while the less reliable type
¯nds doing so worthwhile when his reputation is low but too costly when it is
above a certain threshold.
Consequently, the motives for both the pooling and separating reputation
coexist in our model, the former (latter) motive for the less (more) reliable type
of seller. Moreover, reputational motives exist permanently in our model because
agents of the more reliable type maintain trustworthy behavior even after they
get separated from the less reliable counterparts and thus, their types revealed.5
It may be worth stressing that such behavior by the more reliable type is driven
precisely by reputational concerns, because it is not viable without presence of
the less reliable type as shown in Section 3.2.
Speci¯cally, we model a situation where a seller randomly draws an item of
either good or bad quality in each period and announces this quality as cheap
talk. Each seller is of one of two private types, high or low ability: a high type
3Mailath and Samuelson (2006) provide an extensive review of the literature.
4Even under imperfect monitoring, Cripps et al. (2004) show that reputational motives
disappear in the long-run because agents' types get revealed eventually.
5In most studies, the stage game payo® is independent of the reputation level in every
period. Hence, the reputational behavior of normal/opportunistic type tend to be station-
ary under in¯nite-horizon perfect monitoring settings, exhibiting little dynamics of reputation
building and cashing in. One way of generating such dynamics is by introducing the stochas-
tic importance level of each period (Sobel, 1985). Another way is to relate the payo® of
opportunistic behavior to the reputation level in a natural manner, such as in our paper and
Benabou and Laroque (1992). In these cases, a less reliable agent is bound to cheat given
a chance if he had been lucky enough in the past to have built up his reputation above a
certain threshold, thus revealing the type. The logic of Cripps et al. (2004) is somewhat dif-
ferent: A long enough history of an agent's past behavior reveals his type with a statistically
overwhelming con¯dence and consequently, he would indulge in opportunistic actions because
each such action makes only a negligible dent on his reputation.Reputation and Communication 4
seller draws a good quality item more frequently. Each item is traded at a price
that is equal to the expected quality based on the seller's prevailing reputation
and his announcement. The buyer learns the true quality and publicly reveals
the truthfulness of the seller's announcement (e.g., ratings in online markets),
which updates the seller's reputation level accordingly.
Without communication, the model gives rise to learning over time through
observation of past quality, and prices re°ect the evolution of beliefs on the
seller's ability but not the true quality of the item for sale. Communication
allows equilibria in which some information on the item's quality is credibly
transmitted by the seller.
Our analysis focuses on equilbria in which high type sellers always announce
truthfully, and we establish that there is a unique equilibrium of this kind. In
this equilibrium each and every truthful announcement increases the seller's rep-
utation, which has the e®ect of increasing the price he receives in the next period
if he claims his item to be of a good quality. Low type sellers of all reputation
levels falsely claim bad quality items to be good with a positive probability for
short-term gain, after which their reputation vanishes. The probability of lying
by a low type seller is a continuous but non-monotonic function of the prevailing
reputation level.
Compared with the case without communication, this equilibrium exhibits
faster learning of the seller's type and more information is incorporated in the
price of the item. It thus mitigates the lemon's problem substantially.
As is often speculated, the reputation mechanism in online markets may
be undermined due to the possibility that a trader may restart by obtaining a
new identity after damaged reputation (in the same or another marketplace).
We also analyze a model in which such restarts are possible and characterize
stationary equilibrium. In particular, we show that this option increases cheating
incentives by limiting the damage from abusing reputation and as a result, the
probability that a low type seller lies is higher than when fresh restarts are
infeasible, uniformly across all reputation levels.
Our paper contributes to the literature on reputation pioneered by Kreps
and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and further developed by
Diamond (1989), Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Mailath and Samuelson (2001),
Ely and Valimaki (2003), and Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004), among
others. More speci¯cally, it contributes to the literature on cheap-talk reputa-
tion which we brie°y describe below. Due to the nature of the issue, it often
concerns experts/advisors and certi¯ers. Sobel (1985) shows that an \enemy"
(an informed agent who has a completely opposing preference to the decision
maker) may build a reputation by mimicking the honest reporting of a \friend"
(who has a perfectly aligned preference with the decision maker). Generalizing
this model to noisy information, Benabou and Laroque (1992) study the reputa-Reputation and Communication 5
tion of ¯nancial experts. In a model where an enemy is biased in one direction,
Morris (2001) shows that even a friend may have a reputational incentive to
lie. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001, 2006) study reputational cheap talk in a dif-
ferent model where experts are motivated by exogenous payo® that increases in
their perceived ability, akin to the career concerns literature.6 A recent paper by
Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009) examines the extent to which reputation
concerns discipline rating agencies.7
As mentioned earlier, our reputation mechanism does not rely on the exis-
tence of an inherently honest type, unlike many papers mentioned above. Also,
in contrast to Sobel (1985) and Morris (2001), a \friendly" seller cannot exist
in our model because sellers have the same monotonic preferences over prices,
i.e., both types of sellers are \enemies." As a consequence, knowing the seller's
type would exacerbate the communication problem for all types in our context,
whilst it would solve the problem for the friendly type in theirs. In this respect,
our contribution di®ers substantially from theirs.
Bar-Isaac (2003) studies a model similar to ours but without the scope of
pre-trade communication because even the seller does not observe the quality.
In a context where the seller incurs a cost to trade in each period, he shows
that the seller's decision to continue to trade is a signal that facilitates learning
process and thus, enhances the seller's reputation. In contrast to our model,
though, lacking means to cash in their reputation by duping buyers, both types
of sellers bene¯t in the same way from high reputation and thus, do not separate
when reputation is above a certain threshold.
Mailath and Samuelson (2001) analyze a moral hazard version of our model
without pre-trade communication and show, inter alia, that for reputation e®ects
to arise the seller's type needs to be subject to continual random changes. Our
results extend to the case of moral hazard (see Section 6) and thus, suggest that
pre-trade communication may restore reputation e®ects in their model even if
the seller's type is ¯xed through time.
Finally, the current paper also makes a methodological innovation in estab-
lishing existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium when Blackwell's condition
for a contraction mapping does not apply, as detailed in Section 4.2.
The next section describes the main model and de¯nes equilibrium. Section
3 presents some preliminary results. Section 4 analyzes the reputation mecha-
nism and characterizes the unique reputation equilibrium in which the high type
sellers always trade truthfully. Section 5 analyzes an extended model in which
6Although the mechanism di®ers for experts, they also ¯nd that often adverse selection on
experts' quality enhances meaningful communication.
7These papers use the adverse selection approach to reputation. Papers (on cheap-talk
reputation) also exist that use the so-called \bootstrap" approach based on the folk theorem
argument, e.g., Park (2005) on cheap talk reputation of di®erentiated experts and McLennan
and Park (2007) on auditor reputation.Reputation and Communication 6
sellers may opt out or restart with a new identity. Section 6 discusses some
further extensions. Appendix contains some technical details.
2 Model
We consider a single marketplace (or website) where sellers of di®erent abilities
interact with a large set of buyers. There are in¯nite periods t = 1;2;¢¢¢, and a
representative seller is either of a high type (µ = h) or a low type (µ = `) where
0 < ` < h < 1. The seller's type µ 2 fh;`g is private information. The seller's
perceived ability in each period t is captured by his reputation ¹t 2 [0;1], the
common belief that the prospective buyers attach to the seller being of a high
type at the beginning of that period.
In each period t, a seller with reputation ¹t draws one item for sale of a ran-
dom quality qt which is good (g) with probability µ and bad (b) with probability
1 ¡ µ where µ 2 fh;`g is the seller's type. We normalize as g = 1 and b = 0.
Observing the quality of the item, the seller publicly makes a cheap talk an-
nouncement mt 2 fG;Bg about its quality, where mt = G (B) is interpreted as
announcing the quality to be g (b).8 We say that the agent lies if he announces
B when qt = g or G when qt = b; and tells the truth if he announces G when
qt = g or B when qt = b.9
The prospective buyers are myopic and try to maximize the expected quality
minus the price paid. We assume a competitive demand side so that each item
is traded at a price that is equal to the expected quality10 calculated, a la Bayes
rule, based on ¹t and the seller's equilibrium strategy of announcing mt. At the
end of the trading period, the purchaser observes the true quality qt and honestly
reports it publicly.11 The seller's reputation is revised from ¹t to ¹t+1 based on
mt and qt, and the period t +1 starts. The seller's objective is to maximize the
discounted sum of its revenue stream with discount factor ± 2 (0;1). At any
date t, the full history of messages and items' quality of the seller is publicly
known. The structure of this game, denoted by ¡, is common knowledge.
Our equilibrium concept is Markov perfect equilibrium, i.e., we focus on
Perfect Bayesian equilibria such that the equilibrium strategies in each period
8Alternatively, we may model that each seller posts a price p at which buyers either buy
or not, and the purchaser of the item reports whether satis¯ed (q ¸ p) or not (q < p). Our
equilibrium continues to be an equilibrium in this alternative model. We don't consider the
possibility that the seller announces his type µ; although we conjecture that this would not
change our results.
9Of course the labelling of the messages is somewhat arbitrary, but it will be unambiguous
when we introduce the reputation equilibrium.
10This is in line with Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Bar-Isaac (2003).
11We assumed that the quality, although observable by the buyer, cannot be veri¯ed ex-post,
so that no warranty contract is feasible.Reputation and Communication 7
depends only on the seller's reputation level of that period. Thus, the seller's
equilibrium strategy is represented by two functions x¤(¹;q) and y¤(¹;q) that
denote, respectively, the probability that a seller of h-type and `-type lies con-
tingent on the prevailing reputation level ¹ 2 [0;1] and the quality q 2 fg;bg of
the item drawn.
Given x¤(¹;q) and y¤(¹;q), a \price/quality pro¯le" p¤
m(¹) is de¯ned as the
posterior probability that the item is of a good quality (q = g) when the seller
with a reputation level ¹ announced m 2 fG;Bg, obtained by Bayes rule from
the seller's strategy whenever possible. Being the expected quality, p¤
m(¹) is also
the price at which the item will be traded.
A \transition rule" is a function ¼¤
mq(¹) that speci¯es the posterior proba-
bility that µ = h in the next period, when in the current period Pr(µ = h) = ¹
and the seller sells an item of quality q 2 fg;bg after announcing m 2 fG;Bg.
We require that ¼¤
mq(¹) be obtained by Bayes rule from the seller's strategy
whenever possible.
Given x¤(¹;q), y¤(¹;q), p¤
m(¹), and ¼¤
mq(¹) as above, we de¯ne the value
function for µ 2 fh;`g, denoted by V ¤
µ (¹) : [0;1] ! R, as the expected discounted
sum of revenue stream of a seller of type µ and reputation ¹.
De¯nition 1 A collection (x¤;y¤;p¤
m;¼¤
mq;V ¤
µ ) is a (Markov perfect) equilibrium
if the followings hold for each µ = h;` where zh = x¤ and z` = y¤:
(i) zµ(¹;g) 2 argmax0·z·1
£
z(p¤
B(¹) + ±V ¤
µ (¼¤
Bg(¹))) + (1 ¡ z
¢¡
p¤





(ii) zµ(¹;b) 2 argmax0·z·1 [z(p¤
G(¹) + ±V ¤
µ (¼¤
Gb(¹))) + (1 ¡ z)(p¤























G(¹) + ±V ¤
µ (¼¤
Gb(¹)))+(1 ¡ zµ(¹;b))(p¤





Before turning to the characterization of the equilibria with adverse selection
and cheap talk, we discuss a few properties of our model.
3 Preliminary Considerations
The term \reputation" in the economic literature encompasses several notions,
two of which are present in our model. First, reputation may refer to the beliefs
concerning the average quality provided by the seller to the market. In our
model this corresponds to the beliefs ¹t on the seller's type µ. Second, the
notion of reputation may refer to the level of con¯dence that consumers have
on the truthfulness of the announcement of the seller concerning the quality of
the good. This notion thus refers more to trust than to beliefs on the type. As
shown below, however, the two concepts are closely related.Reputation and Communication 8
We use the term \learning" to refer to the fact that the mere observation of
the history of quality qt helps consumers improve their knowledge on the seller's
type, in a non-strategic manner.
3.1 The learning equilibrium
Suppose that there is no communication, say because the seller doesn't observe
the quality of the good. Then, in every period a seller's item is traded at a price
equal to the expected quality
pt = E(qj¹t) = ¹th + (1 ¡ ¹t)`:




¹th + (1 ¡ ¹t)`
> ¹t if qt = g
¹t+1 =
¹t(1 ¡ h)
¹t(1 ¡ h) + (1 ¡ ¹t)(1 ¡ `)
< ¹t if qt = b:
Beliefs and prices follow a martingale, so that the price increases or declines
depending on whether the quality delivered last period was good or bad.
Notice that this equilibrium remains as an equilibrium in the game ¡ de-
scribed in Section 2, i.e., the so-called \babbling equilibrium." For instance
such an equilibrium obtains when the seller always announces G and thus, the
message mt, containing no information content, is ignored. The beliefs and the
price evolve as in the learning equilibrium above and since announcement doesn't
a®ect the continuation game, it is trivially optimal for the seller to announce G:
3.2 A single type
Now suppose that there is a single type, say type `. (As we shall see below, this is
di®erent from saying that the buyers' beliefs assign probability 1 to µ = `.) Due
to risk-neutrality and certainty to trade, our model has the feature that there is
a zero value for the seller of transmitting information to the buyer in this case.
The reason is that the ex-ante payo® is equal to the expected price which always
coincides with the expected quality. An implication is that repeated interaction
cannot help to foster communication in this set-up.
To see this, consider any equilibrium of our game when a seller's type is
publicly observed to be `. Because the price is the expected value conditional
on the information available at date t; the ex-ante expected price must be equal
to `: Thus, any equilibrium generates an expected payo® of `
1¡±:
Another consequence is that there cannot be any information transmitted
through communication. To see this, consider any period and suppose that theReputation and Communication 9
message is informative in that period. This would mean that the probability
y¤(b) of announcing m = G when q = b is not equal to the probability 1¡y¤(g)
of announcing G when q = g. Then, the prices would di®er for the two messages.
But we have seen that the expected payo® from the next period on must be equal
to `
1¡± independently of the message to be sent. Hence, the seller would announce
with certainty the message that would generate the highest price, irrespective
of q, which would contradict y¤(b) 6= 1 ¡ y¤(g):
Thus, when the type of the seller is publicly observed, the unique equilibrium
outcome is the no communication equilibrium outcome.
3.3 On communication in equilibrium
We say that an equilibrium involves communication if there is a positive prob-
ability that at some date the message conveys some information. In our model,
there are two types of information that can be transmitted: information about
the current level of quality, g or b, and information about the type µ:
Before we turn to the equilibrium analysis it is worth noting that the two
types of information transmission are related in a non-trivial way. In our set-up,




with a positive probability in some period t. To see this, observe that if the strat-
egy of the seller is independent of his type then it must be the case that the poste-
rior ¹t+1 depends only on the history of the realized quality ht = (q1;¢¢¢ ;qt) and
not on the history of message mt = (m1;:::;mt), i.e., Pr(µjht;mt) = Pr(µjht):
Similarly, some information about the product quality (q) will be transmitted
if p¤
G(¹t) 6= p¤
B(¹t) with a positive probability and both messages may be sent
with positive probability in some period.
We asserted above that communication about the quality of the item is not
possible if there is a single type. This observation extends to the following
property when there are multiple types, i.e., in a setting of adverse selection:
Property: Messages cannot convey information on the quality of the good un-
less they convey information on the type of the seller.
To see this, suppose that no information on µ is transmitted by messages
in equilibrium. Then, updated beliefs would be a function only of the his-
tory of quality as argued above, which would imply that in any period the
expected future payo® of a seller is independent of the current message to send.
If p¤
G(¹t) 6= p¤
B(¹t), therefore, both types of seller would send the same message
with probability 1 (the one that fetches a higher price), which would dictate
that the messages be uninformative, i.e., p¤
G(¹t) = p¤
B(¹t), a contradiction.Reputation and Communication 10
Therefore, adverse selection and signalling about the type are necessary in-
gredients for messages to be a credible signal of quality in our environment.
4 Reputation Equilibrium
We now turn to analysis of equilibrium with reputation. As we wish to study
the extent to which reputation motives help to induce truthful revelation of the
quality of the product, we focus on equilibria with the following properties:
(a) an h-type seller always tells the truth regardless of q so long as ¹ > 0, i.e.,
x¤(¹;q) = 0 for all ¹ > 0; and
(b) the value function V ¤
µ (¹) is non-decreasing in ¹ for µ = h;`.
The ¯rst property lends the idea that beliefs about the types will gen-
erate trust in messages. The intuition behind this property is that build-
ing/maintaining reputation through truthful announcement of the quality is less
costly for an h-type seller because he knows he will have more good draws than
an `-type seller, whence he should announces the truth with a larger probability.
The property (b) states that a seller's expected pro¯t increases with the
market's belief about his type. Notice that the expected quality of the product,
¹h + (1 ¡ ¹)`, increases with ¹. This would be the payo® of a seller in a one-shot
game or if ± = 0. The property states that this monotonicity property extends
to our dynamic setting, which seems natural.
We refer to such an equilibrium as a non-trivial reputation (NTR) equilib-
rium, to distinguish from the evolution of beliefs due to pure learning:
De¯nition 2 An equilibrium satisfying (a) and (b) is called a NTR-equilibrium.
In characterizing the equilibrium, we proceed in three steps. First, we derive
some useful properties of the equilibrium. Then, we use these properties to prove
existence, continuity and uniqueness of the value function for an `-type seller.
Finally, we show that telling the truth is the optimal strategy for an h-type
seller.
4.1 Some properties of NTR-equilibria
A ¯rst trivial remark is that it is not possible that an `-type seller always tells
the truth. If he were to always tell the truth, the equilibrium price would be
p¤
G (¹) = 1. Then, upon drawing a low quality item, by falsely reporting as good
(m = G) he would get a payo® of at least 1 + ±`=(1 ¡ ±) because in any future
period there is a message that would get a price at least ` (since the expectedReputation and Communication 11
quality in the market is equal to some weighted average of p¤
G and p¤
B), which
is better than the expected payo® from telling the truth, ±`=(1 ¡ ±). Thus, full
revelation of q by both types of seller is not possible.
Nonetheless, due to property (b) there should be no incentive to misreport
good quality as bad, since this would reduce the current price without enhancing
next period's reputation. We ¯rst show that this is indeed the case:
Lemma 1 In any NTR-equilibrium,
y
¤(¹;g) = 0 and p
¤
B(¹) = 0 8¹ 2 (0;1]: (1)
Proof. First, we show that p¤
G(¹) ¸ p¤
B(¹) for all ¹ > 0. If y¤(¹;b) = 0, then
p¤
G(¹) = 1 > p¤
B(¹) is immediate by property (a) and Bayes rule. If y¤(¹;b) > 0,
then p¤
G(¹) + ±V ¤
` (¼¤
Gb(¹)) ¸ p¤
B(¹) + ±V ¤
` (¼¤
Bb(¹)) and ¼¤
Gb(¹) = 0 < ¼¤
Bb(¹) by




Now, to prove (1) by contradiction, suppose y¤(¹;g) > 0 for some ¹ >
0, which would imply ¼¤
Bg(¹) = 0 < ¹ < ¼¤
Gg(¹) by (a) and Bayes rule and
thus, p¤
G(¹) + ±V ¤
` (¹0) · p¤
B(¹) + ±V ¤
` (0) where ¹0 = ¼¤
Gg(¹). Hence, from (b)
and p¤
G(¹) ¸ p¤




` (¹0) = V ¤
` (0). Since ¹ < ¹0, we would also have V ¤
` (¹) = V ¤
` (0) by (b). In
addition, note that y¤(¹;b) > 0 because y¤(¹;b) = 0 would mean that p¤
G(¹) =
1 = p¤
B(¹), an impossibility. Hence, V ¤
` (¹) = p¤
G(¹) + ±V ¤
` (0). Then, since
V ¤
` (¹0) ¸ p¤
m(¹0) + ±V ¤
` (0) holds for either m 2 fG;Bg, the equality V ¤
` (¹0) =
V ¤
` (¹) obtained above would imply that p¤
m(¹0) · p¤
G(¹) must hold for both
m = G;B. But, this is impossible because some weighted average of p¤
G(¹0) and
p¤
B(¹0) is the expected quality of an item drawn by a seller of reputation ¹0,
hence must be strictly greater than p¤
G(¹) = p¤
B(¹) = ¹h + (1 ¡ ¹)`. Therefore,
we have to conclude that y¤(¹;g) = 0 for all ¹ > 0:
Finally, y¤(¹;g) = 0 and (a) imply that p¤
B(¹) = 0; since message m = B is
sent with positive probability (at least by h-type) but only when q = b.
Observe that in equilibrium, once a seller's reputation falls to ¹ = 0, he can-
not increase his reputation above 0, because Bayes rule dictates that ¼¤
mq(0) = 0
for any m that is sent with a positive probability for quality q at ¹ = 0. There-
fore, a seller with reputation 0 announces the message that gives the highest
price regardless of q, which implies that the seller gets the same equilibrium
price, `, regardless of q. This is the case when an `-type seller's announcement
strategy is independent of q when ¹ = 0. Since labeling of the messages is in-
consequential due to the costless nature of cheap talk messages, we make the
convention that an `-type seller announces G regardless of q when ¹ = 0, i.e.,
y
¤(0;g) = 0; y
¤(0;b) = 1 and p
¤
G(0) = `; p
¤
B(0) = 0: (2)Reputation and Communication 12
Next, it is straightforward to verify that payo®s at extreme beliefs coincide
with those under full information:
Lemma 2 In any NTR-equilibrium, V ¤
` (0) = `
1¡± and V ¤
h (1) = h
1¡±:
Proof. Consider an `-type seller with ¹ = 0. By (2) and Bayes rule, his reputa-
tion remains constant at 0 and he gets a price p¤
G(0) = ` in every period. Hence,
V ¤
` (0) = `=(1 ¡ ±). Next, consider an h-type seller with ¹ = 1. By property (a)
and Bayes rule, his reputation remains constant at 1 and he gets p¤
G(1) = 1 with
a probability h and p¤
B(1) = 0 with a probability 1 ¡ h in every period. Hence,
V ¤
h (1) = h=(1 ¡ ±).
Having pinned down y¤(¹;g) = 0 for all ¹ as in (1) and (2) above, we now
focus on the equilibrium values of y¤(¹;b). For notational ease, we use y¤(¹)
as shorthand for y¤(¹;b) in the sequel. For any given y¤(¹), we de¯ne the
equilibrium prices and transition rules as explained below.
For every ¹;y 2 [0;1], we de¯ne
pG(¹;y) :=
¹h + (1 ¡ ¹)`
¹h + (1 ¡ ¹)(` + (1 ¡ `)y)
; (3)
the expected quality of the product claimed as good (m = G) by a seller with
reputation ¹ if an `-type seller would falsely claim so with probability y. In





whereas the price is p¤
B(¹) = 0 when the seller announces B as asserted above.
The following observations are straightforward from (3):
Property (I) For y > 0 and ¹ < 1, pG(¹;y) strictly increases in ¹ and strictly
decreases in y, with pG(¹;0) = 1 for all ¹, pG(1;y) = 1 for all y, and
pG(0;1) = `.
We now consider beliefs. First, note that ¼¤
Bg(¹) is not de¯ned by Bayes rule
because a seller never claims m = B when q = g. We set ¼¤
Bg(¹) = 0 without
loss of generality: Since V ¤
µ (¹) is minimal at ¹ = 0, this does not a®ect incentive
compatibility conditions (i) of De¯nition 1.
Next, consider the beliefs when the seller announces truthfully. For all
(¹;y) 6= (0;1), we de¯ne the following values:
¼Gg(¹) :=
¹h




¹(1 ¡ h) + (1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ `)(1 ¡ y)
: (5)Reputation and Communication 13
Note that ¼Gg(¹t) is the Bayes-updated reputation level (¹t+1) when a seller
of reputation ¹t announced mt = G and the purchaser reported qt = g; and
¼Bb(¹t;y¤(¹t)) = ¼¤
Bb(¹t) is that when a seller of reputation ¹t announced mt =
B and the purchaser reported qt = b. Thus, we have
Property (II) For y < 1 and ¹ < 1, ¼Gg(¹) and ¼Bb(¹;y) strictly increases in ¹,
and ¼Bb(¹;y) strictly increases in y, with ¼Bb(¹;1) = 1 and ¼Bb(1;y) = 1.
Lastly, if a seller lies when q = b, the updated reputation level should be
¼¤
Gb(¹) = 0 by Bayes rule, except when ¹ = 1 or y¤(¹) = 0: However, for ¹ < 1;
there is no loss of generality in assuming that ¼¤
Gb(¹) = 0 when y¤(¹) = 0 since,
as before, this does not a®ect the incentive compatibility condition at ¹ < 1.
(In addition, we will show shortly that y¤(¹) = 0 never happens.)
Determining ¼¤
Gb(1) is a little more delicate because it determines the value
of V ¤
` (1) and thereby, the optimality of y¤(¹) = 1 for ¹ < 1 via determining the
deviation value when an `-type seller with reputation ¹ announced truthfully
upon drawing q = b, which would induce belief ¼Bb(¹;1) = 1:
The value of ¼¤
Gb(1) also plays a central role for a seller of \maximal rep-
utation" ¹ = 1, who, upon drawing q = b, has a choice between maintaining
its reputation with a low current price (p¤
B(1) = 0), and a high current price of
p¤
G(1) = 1 followed by a drop of future pro¯ts from V ¤
µ (1) to V ¤
µ (¼¤
Gb(1)) due to
lost reputation. The next lemma characterizes what happens for an `-type seller
at ¹ = 1 in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 In any NTR-equilibrium,





` (¹) = V` :=
1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ` + `2)
(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±`)
;
(iii) if y¤(¹) < 1 for some ¹, then V ¤
` (1) = V` and V ¤
` (¼¤
Gb(1)) = V ¤
` (0).
(iv) if y¤(¹) ´ 1, then there exists an NTR-equilibrium with the same seller's
strategy (i.e., y¤(¹) ´ 1) and ¼¤
Gb(1) = 0 and V ¤
` (1) = V`:
Proof. See Appendix.
The lemma implies that without loss of generality we can set ¼¤
Gb(1) = 0.
This does not a®ect the value function V ¤
` due to Lemma 3 (iii) if an `-seller
announces truthfully with some probability when q = b. In the case that an
`-seller lies whenever q = b, there is some °exibility in setting the beliefs ¼¤
Gb(1)
that would a®ect the value V ¤
` (1) but not the value function V ¤
` (¹) for ¹ < 1.
However, this is irrelevant for the equilibrium path since an `-seller never reaches
the maximum reputation level ¹ = 1 in equilibrium. The value V ¤
` (1) solves
V ¤
` (1) = 1 + ±(`V ¤
` (1) + (1 ¡ `)V ¤
` (0)), yielding V` in the lemma.Reputation and Communication 14
In the sequel, therefore, we restrict attention to NTR-equilibria such that
¼¤
Gb(1) = 0. For such an NTR-equilibrium, we always have
V
¤
` (1) = V
¤
` (0) + ¢
where
¢ :=
1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ` + `2)








4.2 Value and policy functions for `-type
For any NTR-equilibrium, in light of Lemma 3 and the conditions (i)-(iii) of
De¯nition 1, an `-seller's value function V ¤








































Observe from (7) that V ¤
` is a ¯xed point of a mapping determined by the
RHS of (7) via a \best response" function y¤ that satis¯es (8). We formally
de¯ne this mapping with a view to applying a ¯xed point theorem on the set
F of all non-decreasing functions V : [0;1] ! R such that V (0) = `
1¡± and
V (1) = `
1¡± + ¢.
For a given V 2 F we de¯ne the \pseudo-best-response" as a function yV :
[0;1] ! [0;1] that satis¯es
(
yV(¹) = 0 if pG(¹;yV(¹)) < ± (V (¼Bb(¹;yV(¹))) ¡ V (0))
yV(¹) = 1 if pG(¹;yV(¹)) > ± (V (¼Bb(¹;yV(¹)))) ¡ V (0)):
(9)
Since pG(¹;y) ¡ ±V (¼Bb(¹;y)) is strictly decreasing in y, there exists a unique
pseudo-best-response yV as veri¯ed below.
The value on the RHS of the inequalities in (9) is the gain from enhanced
reputation that accrues to the seller when he truthfully announces a bad quality.
Notice that it is bounded by ±¢ < 1 by (6). This has two implications. First,
since pG (¹;0) = 1 > ±¢, it must be the case that an `-seller lies with a positive
probability if q = b, i.e. yV (¹) > 0 for all ¹. Second,
¹ ¹ := inf f¹ 2 [0;1] j pG(¹;1) > ±¢g < 1
where the inequality follows from pG (1;1) = 1. Then, it is immediate from
Property (I) that yV(¹) = 1 for all ¹ > ¹ ¹. Notice that the threshold ¹ ¹ may be
zero, in which case an `-type seller always lies whenever q = b.Reputation and Communication 15
At the other end of the interval, because ¼Bb(0;y) = 0 for all y < 1; it must
be the case that an `-seller lies with probability 1 if q = b at ¹ = 0. Lastly, for




0)) ¡ V (0)) · pG(¹;y) · ± lim
y0#y
(V (¼Bb(¹;y
0)) ¡ V (0)): (10)





1 if ¹ > ¹ ¹
the unique y that satis¯es (10) if 0 < ¹ · ¹ ¹
1 if ¹ = 0:
(11)
The properties of yV(¹) are also characterized below.
Lemma 4 For any V 2 F; yV(¹) is continuous and strictly positive on [0;1]
and pG(¹;yV(¹)) is nondecreasing in ¹.
Proof. For each ¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹], by construction, yV(¹) is the value of y at which
the graph of pG(¹;y) intersects with the \connected" graph of ±(V (¼Bb(¹;y))¡
V (0)), i.e., the latter graph is connected vertically at every discontinuity points
by the shortest distance. Since both of the graphs are uniformly continuous
as functions of ¹, the intersection point changes continuously in ¹, i.e., yV(¹)
is continuous on ¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹]. Since pG(¹;0) = 1 > ±¢ as argued above, the
intersection takes place at some y > 0, establishing that yV(¹) > 0 for ¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹]
as well as when ¹ = 0 and ¹ > ¹ ¹ as per (11).
Furthermore, note that yV(¹) ! 1 as ¹ ! 0 because, for every y < 1,
¼Bb(¹;y) ! 0 as ¹ ! 0 and thus, ±(V (¼Bb(¹;y)) ¡ V (0)) < ` · pG(¹;y) for all
¹ su±ciently small. Since yV(¹ ¹) = 1 by construction (using yV(0) = 1 if ¹ ¹ = 0),
it follows that yV(¹) is continuous on [0;1].
For ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹, we have pG(¹;yV(¹)) = pG(¹;1) which increases in ¹ by Property
(I). For ¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹), note that the two aforementioned graphs move upward as
¹ increases due to Property (I) and (II). Hence, the height of the intersection
point also increases, i.e., pG(¹;yV(¹)) weakly increases in ¹.
Finally, de¯ne a mapping T : F ! F by
T(V )(¹) := pG(¹;yV(¹)) + ± (`V (¼Gg(¹)) + (1 ¡ `)V (0)): (12)
The next result establishes that the value function V ¤
` of an NTR-equilibrium
can be computed as a ¯xed point of the operator T.
Lemma 5 T(F) ½ F and for any NTR-equilibrium, V ¤
` is a ¯xed point of T and
y¤(¹) = yV ¤
` (¹).Reputation and Communication 16
Proof. Since ¼Gg(¹) increases in ¹ and pG(¹;yV(¹)) is non-decreasing in ¹ by
Lemma 4, it follows that T(V ), de¯ned in (12), is non-decreasing in ¹.
Next, since yV(0) = 1 and ¼Gg(0) = 0, we have T(V )(0) = pG(0;1) +
±(`V (0) + (1 ¡ `)V (0)) which yields T(V )(0) = `=(1 ¡ ±):
Also, since yV(1) = ¼Gg(1) = 1 and pG(1;1) = 1, we have T(V )(1) = 1 +
±(`V (1) + (1 ¡ `)V (0)) which yields T(V )(1) = `=(1 ¡ ±) + ¢.
To prove that V ¤
` is a ¯xed point, ¯rst notice that the condition (8) implies
that condition (9) is satis¯ed and thus that y¤ = yV ¤
` : Since y¤(¹) = yV ¤
` (¹) > 0
by Lemma 4, we deduce from (7) and (8) that T(V ¤
` )(¹) = V ¤
` (¹) for all ¹:
Although T : F ! F is well-de¯ned, ¯xed point theorems may not be
applied directly because F is not a compact set. This problem is resolved by
showing that we can restrict attention to the set Fr of all right-continuous and
non-decreasing functions on [0,1], which is compact in the weak topology (see,
e.g., Billingsley, 1999). We will then show that T is continuous. For this we will
need two key results.
The ¯rst result is continuity of the equilibrium value function.
Lemma 6 If T(V ) = V then V is continuous and strictly increasing.





pG(0;1) + ±(1 ¡ `)V (0)
1 ¡ ±`
= V (0):
Since yV(¹) = 1 for all ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ and ¼Gg(¹) is continuous with ¼Gg(1) = 1, we




1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ` + `2)
(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±`)
= V (1):
Next, since yV(¹) is continuous in ¹ by Lemma 4, (12) implies that
jV
+(¹) ¡ V





holds for all ¹ 2 (0;1) where V +(¹) = lim¹0#¹ V (¹0) and V ¡(¹) = lim¹0"¹ V (¹0).
This implies that jV +(¹) ¡ V ¡(¹)j ´ 0 since ± < 1: Thus, V is continuous.
Finally, it is clear from (12) that V is strictly increasing on (¹ ¹;1) because
pG(¹;1) is strictly increasing and ¼Gg(¹) is nondecreasing. If V were not strictly
increasing on (0;1), one could ¯nd the highest value ¹0 · ¹ ¹ such that V (¹) is
constant on some interval (¹0 ¡ ";¹0). For su±ciently small " > 0, we would
have ¼Gg(¹) > ¹0 if ¹ 2 (¹0 ¡ ";¹0) and thus, V (¼Gg(¹)) < V (¼Gg(¹0)). Since
pG(¹;yV(¹)) is non-decreasing by Lemma 4, we would then have
V (¹
0) = pG(¹;yV(¹
0)) + ±(`V (¼Gg(¹
0)) + (1 ¡ `)V (0))
> pG(¹;yV(¹)) + ±(`V (¼Gg(¹)) + (1 ¡ `)V (0)) = V (¹);Reputation and Communication 17
contradicting the supposition that V (¹) is constant on (¹0 ¡ ";¹0). This proves
that V is strictly increasing.
The second result is a restriction on the evolution of beliefs in equilibrium.
Lemma 7 If T(V ) = V , then ¼Bb(¹;yV(¹)) > ¹ all ¹ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since it is easily veri¯ed that ¼Bb(¹;yV(¹)) > ¹ if and only if y > ^ y = h¡`
1¡`,
there is a uniform lower bound on the probability that `-type sellers misreport
a bad quality.
Lemma 7 is key to our analysis because it implies that along any equilibrium
path, the reputation level, and thus the price p¤
G, increases until the seller, in
case he is of an `-type, reveals his type by falsely claiming a high quality, at
which point the reputation level drops to 0 and the price to `. We are now
ready to state our ¯rst main result.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique ¯xed point of T.
Proof. See Appendix.
As mentioned above, existence follows from the continuity of the operator
T on the set Fr: The result thus di®ers from Benabou-Laroque (1992): In a
model of ¯nancial experts who can manipulate the market by distorting informa-
tion, they obtain existence and uniqueness by applying Blackwell's Theorem.12
This is not applicable to our model because our sellers may bene¯t by distorting
information in only one direction, unlike their model where information holders
can bene¯t by distorting the market in either direction, which generates sym-
metry in the model. More precisely, T is not nondecreasing in V and hence,
Blackwell's condition for a contraction is not applicable. A second key di®er-
ence is that Benabou and Laroque assume continuity whereas we do not restrict
a priory to continuous functions.
Uniqueness is obtained separately from existence by using the properties of
the ¯xed point. It stems from the observation that the value function is uniquely
determined for ¹ > ¹ ¹. Using the fact that any truthful announcement enhances
reputation along equilibrium path (Lemma 7), it is then possible to show that
there is a unique way to \unravel" the value function by backward induction from
the (stochastic) date where belief jumps above ¹ ¹. A similar idea is exploited in
Mathis, McAndrew and Rochet (2009) to obtain a constructive proof of existence
in a model of rating agencies. Their proof relies on the fact that only positive
claims generate trade and thus can be veri¯ed, which simpli¯es the analysis
greatly. In our model both positive and negative claims can be veri¯ed.
12Morris (2001) and Bar-Isaac (2003) also use Blackwell's Theorem.Reputation and Communication 18
4.3 Optimality for h-type and equilibrium
We have established that there is a unique pair of V ¤
` and y¤(¹) that is consis-
tent with an NTR-equilibrium. The prices are then p¤
G(¹) = pG(¹;y¤(¹)) and
p¤
B(¹) = 0: We now establish the conditions under which truthful announcement
is an equilibrium strategy for an h-seller and thus, an NTR-equilibrium exists.
In doing so, without loss of generality we set the o®-equilibrium beliefs as
¼
¤
Bg(¹) = 0 · ¼Gg(¹) 8¹ 2 [0;1]; (13)
which ensures that reputation deteriorates after a false claim.
Let V ¤
h be the value function of an h-seller calculated from x¤(¹;q) = 0, given
the strategy y¤ = yV ¤
` obtained for the unique ¯xed point V ¤
` of T, and prices
p¤
m and transition rules ¼¤
mq de¯ned for y¤: Recall that x¤(0;q) has not been
speci¯ed, yet. Thus, V ¤
h (0) is to be determined. Since ¼Gg(0) = ¼¤
Bg(0) = 0,
however, x¤(0;g) = 0 is clearly optimal.
For the moment we restrict attention to the cases that an h-seller lies with

















Later we will consider the possibility that V ¤
h (0) is larger, but this will not
enlarge the set of parameters for existence.
Since ¼¤
Bb(0) is unde¯ned by Bayes rule, we can ensure that (14) is satis¯ed
by setting ¼¤
Bb(0) = 0, in which case x¤(0;b) = 1 is an optimal strategy of an
h-seller at ¹ = 0 when q = b. Higher values of ¼¤
Bb(0) subject to (14) would
also work so long as optimality of y¤(1) is retained, but they are inconsequential
along the equilibrium path. Thus, we set ¼¤
Bb(0) = 0 without loss of generality.
Since pG(¹;y) > ` for all ¹;y 2 (0;1], an h-seller can guarantee a payo®
exceeding `=(1 ¡ ±) in any continuation subgame by always claiming q = g.
Thus, V ¤
h (¹) > V ¤
h (0) for all ¹ > 0, so it is clear from (13) that x¤(¹;g) = 0 is
optimal for an h-seller for all ¹ > 0, as well as when ¹ = 0 as shown earlier.
Let us now consider h-seller's strategy when q = b: Once ¹ = 1 is reached,
upon drawing q = b, an h-seller gets ±V ¤
h (1) by reporting truthfully and 1 +
±V ¤
h (0) by reporting untruthfully because ¼¤
Gb(1) = 0 by Lemma 3 (iii) and
Lemma 6. Thus, it is optimal for an h-seller to report truthfully if and only if
±(V ¤
h (1) ¡ V ¤
h (0)) ¸ 1 where V ¤
h (1) = h + ±V ¤
h (1), or equivalently,
h ¡ ` ¸
1 ¡ ±
±
() ± ¸ ±h :=
1
h ¡ ` + 1
; (15)
which we assume below. It is clear that no NTR-equilibrium exists if (15) fails
because the property (a) would not be satis¯ed.Reputation and Communication 19
For ¹ > 0; we show V ¤
h (¹) > V ¤
` (¹) holds below, based on the fact that
an h-seller, if followed the same strategy as an `-seller, would obtain a higher
expected payo® because he would get a better sequence of draws on average.
Lemma 8 If V ¤
` = T(V ¤
` ); then V ¤
h (¹) > V ¤
` (¹) for all ¹ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Upon drawing q = b in any period with a prevailing reputation ¹ > 0, both
types of seller would get the same expected payo®, pG(¹;y¤(¹)) + ±V ¤
h (0), from
announcing m = G by (14); but the payo® from announcing m = B would be
higher for an h-seller than for an `-seller according to Lemma 8. Since an `-seller
is indi®erent between announcing m = G and m = B for ¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹), it follows
that an h-seller must announce m = B with probability 1. For ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹, an h-
seller must announce m = B for sure because the future gain from truth-telling,
±(V ¤
h (1) ¡ V ¤
h (0)), exceeds the short-term gain of lying, pG(¹;y¤(¹)), by (15).
This leads to our second main result.
Theorem 2 There exists an NTR-equilibrium if and only if ± ¸ ±h: The equi-
librium outcome is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
To complete the characterization of NTR-equilibrium, we should point out
that because the incentive constraint of h-seller is slack for ¹ > 0; there is the
possibility that the value V ¤
h (0) di®ers from V ¤
` (0), which would be the case if
x¤(0;b) = 0. For this to hold in equilibrium, however, ¼¤
Bb(0) needs to be large
enough for an h-seller to be willing to sacri¯ce a current pro¯t ` to enhance
his reputation to ¼¤
Bb(0), but not so large that an `-seller would want to do the
same. A natural candidate would be the limit of ¼¤
Bb(¹) as ¹ ! 0. In addition,
to extend the argument in the proof of Theorem 2 on incentive compatibility of
h-type, we must preserve the property that the incentive to build reputation is
higher for h-type than `-type, i.e., V ¤
h (¹) ¡ V ¤
h (0) ¸ V ¤
` (¹) ¡ V ¤
` (0). We show
that this is the case if h is large and the seller is patient enough.
Proposition 1 If h > 1+
p
1+4`2+4`3
2+2` and ± is large enough, there exists an equi-
librium such that x¤(¹;q) = 0 for all ¹ 2 [0;1] and q 2 fg;bg.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.4 Discussion of the equilibrium
In the unique equilibrium outcome, an `-seller lies with certainty when q = b if
¹ ¸ ¹ ¹. We may thus distinguish two types of equilibria depending on whetherReputation and Communication 20
¹ ¹ is positive or zero. Notice that the threshold ¹ ¹ is positive if ± is large enough
so that
±¢ > ` = pG(0;1) () ± > ±` :=
`
1 ¡ ` + `2: (16)
The following is immediate since yV ¤
` (¹) 2 (0;1) was established for ¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹)
from earlier discussion.
Corollary 1 If ± · ±`, then y¤(¹) = 1 for all ¹ 2 [0;1], while if ± > ±` then
y¤(¹) < 1 for 0 < ¹ < ¹ ¹:
Thus, if ±h · ± · ±`, all NTR-equilibria have a simple characterization: `-
sellers always lie upon drawing a bad item (and are honest otherwise).13 Hence,
the trading price pt increases over time until a bad draw occurs, at which point
the type is revealed. Then, pt drops to ` for good if µ = `; whilst pt = qt in all
subsequent periods if µ = h, i.e., pt re°ects the true quality.
If ± > maxf±h;±`g, on the other hand, an `-seller with a reputation below
¹ ¹ randomizes between announcing truthfully and untruthfully upon drawing
q = b. As long as he tells the truth, he builds reputation and thus bene¯ts from
higher future prices for items he will announce to be good. Thus, reputation
increases over time until one of two events occurs:
i) the seller falsely announces m = G when q = b, in which case his type is
revealed to be ` and the price drops to ` for good; or
ii) the seller truthfully announces m = B when his reputation is ¹ > ¹ ¹, in
which case his type is revealed to be h and the price re°ects the true quality in
the future.
A salient characteristic of the NTR-equilibrium is that information on seller's
type is revealed much faster than in the case without communication, where
convergence occurs only asymptotically.
Corollary 2 In the NTR-equilibrium, the true type of seller is known in ¯nite
time with probability 1.
Proof. If a message is invalidated in some period, the type is known to be `.
As long as messages are truthful, reputation increases so there is ¹ t such that
¹t > ¹ ¹ for sure if t > ¹ t: Then if there were no lie before ¹ t; the type is discovered
in the ¯rst period t > ¹ t such that qt = b, which occurs within a ¯nite horizon
with probability 1.
Thus, communication helps to mitigate the asymmetric information problem
along two dimensions that are intrinsically related:
13In this case the equilibrium may vary in V ¤
` (1) and ¼Gb(1;1) subject to V ¤
` (1) = 1 +
±(`V ¤
` (1) + (1 ¡ `)V ¤
` (¼Gb(1;1))), but they all generate the same equilibrium outcome.Reputation and Communication 21
i) it helps credible communication of the true quality, thereby mitigating the
lemon's problem;
ii) it helps consumers learn the true type of the seller.
Compared to the case of pure learning in Section 3.1, a key di®erence concerns
updating of reputation following a bad draw (q = b). In the learning equilibrium
it is given by ¹t+1(b) = ¼Bb(¹t;0) < ¹t. In the NTR-equilibrium reputation
improves as long as the seller announces truthfully. Thus, while a bad quality is
perceived as \bad news" when communication is not possible, it is perceived as
\good news" in our model if truthfully announced.
The price dynamics also di®er substantially. Along the NTR-equilibrium
path, the price for items announced to be good increases over time roughly in
line with the reputation until the seller's type is revealed, while the price stays
constant at zero for items announced bad. In contrast, the price in the learning
equilibrium follows a martingale where the price of date t is independent of the
realization of the quality at date t.
5 Outside Option and New-life
Up to now we have assumed that sellers stay in one marketplace forever and that
memory is in¯nite. One of the issues surrounding the reputation mechanism
based on consumer ratings is that sellers may ¯nd ways to escape from the
bad consequences of damaged reputation. For instance, sellers may obtain an
expected payo® above V ¤
` (0) by changing to another marketplace. Moreover,
even within a given marketplace, it may be di±cult to keep track of the identity
of a seller, in which case a seller may have at any date an option to erase his
history by changing his identity and start again as a new-comer.14 We examine
the extent to which this possibility a®ects reputation mechanism.
5.1 Equilibrium with an outside option
First, consider the case that sellers have an option to leave the market at the end
of any period, in which case he receives a ¯xed outside option, valued at vo, in the
subsequent period where vo 2 ( `
1¡±; 1
1¡±). We characterize an NTR-equilibrium
in this environment.
Recall that an NTR-equilibrium is one that satis¯es properties (a) and (b).
As before,15 it is characterized by the probability yy(¹) that an `-seller announces
14The ability to do so depends on the technology used by the platforms. This is known to
be an issue with eBay for instance (see Delarocas 2006), but would be less of an issue when
the platform controls the bank coordinates or the social status of companies, for then it would
involve creating a new ¯rm which is costly.
15The same argument as before shows that an `-seller truthfully announces when q = g:Reputation and Communication 22
m = G when q = b and value functions V
y
µ for µ 2 fh;`g. Then,
y
y(0) = 1 and V
y






To see this, note that V
y
` (0) ¸ pG(0;yy(0)) + ±vo > `
1¡±. If yy(0) < 1, then
V
y
` (0) = `pG(0;yy(0))+±(`V
y
` (¼Gg(0))+(1¡`)(V y(¼Bb(0;yy(0)))) · `+±V
y
` (0),
which would contradict V
y
` (0) > `
1¡±. Hence, we conclude that yy(0) = 1. Thus,
V
y
` (0) = pG(0;1) + ± maxfvo;V
y
` (0)g = ` + ±vo.
In addition, an argument analogous to the proof of Lemma 3 establishes, so





y(1) = 1; V
y
` (1) =






Gb(1)) · vo: (18)
Let
¢vo :=




` (1) ¡ vo: (19)
De¯ne Fvo to be the set of all non-decreasing functions V on [0;1] such that
V (0) = V
y
` (0) and V (1) = V
y
` (1). De¯ne y
y
V(¹) in the same manner as in (10)
and (11) with V (0) replaced by vo and ¹ ¹ replaced by ¹ ¹y := inff¹ j pG(¹;1) >
±¢vog < ¹ ¹ where the last inequality follows from ±¢vo< ¢. As long as ±¢vo> `
so that y
y
V(¹) < 1 for some ¹, which we assume below, we have y
y
V(¹) 2 (0;1)
for ¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹y) with lim¹!0 y
y
V(¹) = 1 because ±
¡
maxfV (¼Bb(¹;y));vog ¡ vo
¢




V(¹))) ¡ vo > pG(¹;y
y




V(¹) is clearly continuous and assumes 1 for ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹y. De¯ne
Tvo : Fvo ! Fvo as




`maxfvo;V (¼Gg(¹))g + (1 ¡ `)vo
¢
: (21)
It is straightforward to verify that Tvo(V ) 2 Fvo.
Then, Lemmas 6 and 7 and Theorem 1 extend to Tvo, establishing that, for
any vo 2 ( `
1¡±; 1
1¡±), there is a unique ¯xed point of Tvo and it is continuous and
strictly increasing. We omit the proofs because they are analogous with straight-
forward changes due to the seller opting to restart whenever his reputation level
is so low that the continuation value falls short of vo.16




Gg(¹))) ¡ `) +
±vo(1¡`)+`
1¡±` ,
which implies that V (~ ¹) ¡ vo <
P1
t=0(pG(¼t
Gg(~ ¹); ^ y) ¡ `)±t`t because
±vo(1¡`)+`
1¡±` < vo:Reputation and Communication 23
In the case that the outside option value is vo for an h-seller as well, optimality
of truth-telling for h-type can be veri¯ed by an argument analogous to that







Thus, a unique equilibrium outcome exists if ± > ±vo when sellers can exit for
an outside option vo.17
If the outside option for the h-type di®ers from vo; Theorem 1 is not valid.
But the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1 establishes existence of
an NTR-equilibrium for su±ciently large ± so long as h-seller's outside option
value is not too large.
To indicate their dependence on vo 2 ( `
1¡±; 1
1¡±) with compact notations, let
yy
vo and V y
vo denote the strategy of an `-type seller and the ¯xed point of Tvo,
respectively. Comparing with the ¯ndings in Section 4, we obtain






¤(¹) 8¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹) and y
y
vo(¹) = y
¤(¹) = 1 8¹ 2 [¹ ¹;1]: (22)
Proof. In the Appendix.
Thus, availability of an option to exit and obtain an outside value larger
than the value attached to bad reputation, results in a uniform increase in the
probability that a bad item is falsely claimed as good. The consequence is a
reduction in the price for items announced as good at all levels of reputation.
At the same time, note that learning takes place faster than in the equilibrium
without such an option for two reasons. First, it is more likely that an `-
seller reveals his type by falsely announcing m = G. Second, reputation gets
updated to higher levels following truthful announcements. This also means
that a reputation level is reached sooner at which the seller's type is revealed
for sure if a bad item is drawn because an `-seller would de¯nitely lie.
5.2 New-life
We now extend the analysis to the case that there is no outside option, but
sellers can erase their history and start as new-comer at any date. To analyze
17Note that an h-seller with any reputation ¹ > 0 does not exit after trading a bad quality
item because the value of updated reputation exceeds vo as (20) indicates. However, both types
of seller may exit after trading a good quality item if the value of the updated reputation,
V
y
µ (¼Gg(¹)), falls short of vo, although the seller would have exited already if this were to be
the case.Reputation and Communication 24
this environment, we need to put more structure on the dynamics behind the
model because the incentive to change identity depends on the beliefs concerning
new-comers, and these beliefs depend on equilibrium strategies.
We assume that there is a single platform on which trade can take place in any
of in¯nite periods, where the past record of each seller is publicly known. There
is a constant measure 1 of sellers on the platform in each period, although there
is an exogenous entry/exit process. Each seller dies with probability Â 2 (0;1)
at the end of each period. These deaths are replaced by measure Â of new-born
sellers at the beginning of the next period. Each new born seller is of h-type
with probability ¹i 2 (0;1).
If sellers cannot change identity, the model is the same as the one studied in
Section 3 where the initial reputation starts at ¹i and the period t is interpreted
as the age or seniority of the seller (the number of trading periods since he joined
the platform).
We suppose that a seller can start afresh with a new identity at any period.
In this case he restarts the process as if he were a new-born seller, and we assume
that it is not possible to distinguish a new-born seller from a old seller restarting
afresh. We focus on stationary equilibria in which the proportion of `-sellers
deciding to start afresh is constant, while h-sellers never lie and consequently,
never change identity.
Thus all new sellers start with a reputation level set at an endogenous default
level ¹0 2 (0;1) which re°ects the mix of genuine new-born sellers (of which a
proportion ¹i are of type h) and equilibrium mass of sellers who restart. Let vo
denote the value of an `-seller starting at the default reputation level ¹0. Notice
that the value function depends on vo, while the mass ¹0 depends on both the
value function and vo.
To endogenously determine ¹0 and vo, we start by treating vo as a parameter
representing an outside option value to be obtained when a seller drops out
of the market, so that we can apply the result from the previous section to
determine the unique equilibrium strategy yy
vo and value function V y
vo of `-seller,
that are consistent with vo. Then, we calculate the value of ¹0 accounting for
the equilibrium mass of `-sellers who restart according to yy
vo. Finally, we search
for a ¯xed point vo that satis¯es vo = V y
vo(¹0).
To determine ¹0 from V y
vo and yy
vo, we calculate the mass of `-sellers who
restart as explained below. Let ½µ(q) denote the probability that a seller of type
µ draws q 2 fg;bg, i.e., ½µ(g) = µ = 1 ¡ ½µ(b). For any hk = (q1;¢¢¢ ;qk) 2
Hk := fg;bgk, let ½µ(hk) be the ex ante probability that hk realizes for a seller
of type µ. We use hk
j = (q1;¢¢¢ ;qj) to denote the ¯rst j-entry truncation of hk.
Given a default reputation ¹0 > 0, let ¼(hk
j) denote the posterior reputation
for a seller who has survived the history hk
j without cheating, updated accordingReputation and Communication 25
to yy
vo.18 Setting ¼(hk














Then, the ex ante probability that an `-seller remains in the market without









j¡1);qj))(1 ¡ Â)]: (24)
Consequently, in a stationary state, the measure of nominally k-period old `-










where Â0 is a stationary-state measure of all sellers who start in each period.
This implies that the total measure of old `-sellers who restart in an arbitrary
period is Â0(1 ¡ ¹0)¤(vo) where











Â0 = Â + Â0(1 ¡ ¹0)¤(vo) =) Â0 =
Â
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹0)¤(vo)
: (25)
Therefore, Bayes rule dictates that the following holds at a stationary state:
¹0 =
Â¹i
Â + Â0(1 ¡ ¹0)¤(vo)
: (26)
Solving (25) and (26) simultaneously, we de¯ne a mapping ¹
y










where the inequality follows from 0 < ¤(vo) < 1.




0(vo)) = vo. We show that such a ¯xed point exist by continuity,




vo(¹;g) = 0.Reputation and Communication 26
Lemma 9 Let Ã : ( `
1¡±; 1
1¡±) ! C[0;1] be a mapping such that Ã(vo) = V y
vo where
C[0;1] is the set of all continuous functions on [0;1]. Then, Ã is continuous in vo
under the sup norm at any vo > `
1¡±:
Proof. See Appendix.
Once existence of a default value vo is established, we obtain the equilibrium
strategy yy
vo and value function V y
vo for `-seller as described in Section 5.1, and the
default reputation level ¹0 = ¹
y
0(vo) as per (27). Finally, by showing optimality
of truth-telling for h-type, we obtain
Theorem 3 If sellers can change identity, a stationary NTR-equilibrium exists
if h(<1) and ± (<1) are su±ciently large.
Proof. Note that, as vo ! `
1¡±, ¹
y
0(vo) converges to a limit strictly greater than 0.
Since the right derivative of pG(¹;yy
vo(¹)) with respect to ¹ is uniformly bounded





0(vo)) > vo for vo su±ciently close to `
1¡±. On the other hand, as vo ! 1
1¡±,
since ¹i < 1 we have V y
vo(¹
y
0(vo)) · V y
vo(¹i) < V y
vo(1) · vo for vo su±ciently close
to 1
1¡±. Then, since ¹
y
0(vo) is continuous in vo from (27) and Ã is continuous by
Lemma 9, we must have V y
vo(¹
y















o). Note that to establish a stationary equi-
librium, we still need to show that it is optimal for h-sellers to always report
truthfully as long as ¹ ¸ ¹s
0. Since the continuation value of h-seller after cheat-




0), rather than V
y
h(0), the
optimality condition of h-seller is more di±cult to verify than when restarting
is impossible. In fact, it has not been proved that for all stationary pair of ¹s
0
and vs
o, truthful reporting for all ¹ ¸ ¹s
0 is optimal for h-sellers when `-sellers
report according to y
y
vs
o(¹) for ¹ ¸ ¹s
0.
However, the proof of Lemma 1 relies on V ¤
` (0) being a constant, rather than
V ¤
` (0) = `
1¡± and consequently, applies analogously to V
y
h(¹) de¯ned as per (47)
in Appendix, with y¤ replaced by y
y
vs
o for ¹ > ¹s








sellers honestly for ¹ ¸ ¹s
0 for any stationary pair ¹s
0 and vs
o, provided that ± < 1





0)) ¸ 1.19 It may be
worth mentioning that this is a su±cient condition, so stationary equilibria in
which h-sellers behave honestly may exist in a wider class of environments.
19The proof is omitted because it is the same as the proof of Lemma 1 with obvious changes,
such as vs
o and ¹ ¹y in place of V ¤
` (0) and ¹ ¹, respectively.Reputation and Communication 27
In any stationary NTR-equilibrium, since Proposition 2 applies without
change, sellers' announcements are less reliable than when fresh restart with
new identity is not possible.
However, this does not mean that untruthful announcements are more fre-
quent in the market when restarts are possible than when they are not: `-sellers
who have lied once, rather than keep lying forever when q = b, would start afresh
and announce according to yy
vo(¹). In fact, when ± is close to 1 there will be
more truthful announcements in the market when sellers are allowed to restart
with a new identity.
Nevertheless, h-sellers tend to su®er more due to untrustworthy behavior of
`-sellers when restarts are possible, because such behavior by sellers who are
\known" to be of `-type (i.e., those with reputation level ¹ = 0), which happens
only when restarts are not allowed, does not a®ect h-sellers.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigate the extent to which the quality of product can be
credibly communicated to prospective buyers in experience good markets. We
show that if there is adverse selection on seller's ability (in supplying good quality
items), credible communication can be sustained by reputational motives in spite
of the inherent con°ict of interests between sellers and buyers. In addition, if
sellers can restart with a new identity, a stationary equilibrium exists but the
reliability of sellers' announcements deteriorates uniformly across all reputation
levels.
To focus on the reputational incentives in pre-trade communication, we car-
ried out our analysis in a model of pure adverse selection on seller's ability.
However, the analysis can be extended to situations that involve moral hazard.
To see this, modify the baseline model in such a way that in each period a seller
draws an item of good quality with a probability h if he exerted high e®ort at
a cost of cµ > 0 that depends on the seller's type µ 2 fh;`g, but he draws a
good item with a probability ` if he exerted low e®ort at zero cost. Note that
our NTR-equilibrium continues to be an equilibrium in this modi¯ed model if
ch is small enough for an h-seller to ¯nd it worthwhile to exert high e®ort,
but c` is large so that an `-seller ¯nds otherwise.20 If pre-trade communication
20This is the case if ±(V ¤
h (¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) ¡ ch
1¡± ¡ V ¤
h (0)) ¸ pG(¹;y¤(¹)) for all ¹, and the
inequality is reversed if c` replaces ch, where V ¤
h (0) = `
1¡± = V ¤
` (0) and y¤, V ¤
` and V ¤
h are as
derived in Section 3. Such values of ch and c` exist because i) ±(V ¤
h (¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹))¡V ¤
h (0)) >
pG(¹;y¤(¹)) for ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ if ± > ±h due to (15), ii) ±(V ¤
` (¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) ¡ V ¤
` (0)) = pG(¹;y¤(¹))
by de¯nition of V ¤
` , and iii) V ¤
h (¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) > V ¤
` (¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) + ³ for some ³ > 0 due to
Lemma 8, continuity of V ¤
µ for ¹ > 0, and lim¹!0 ¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) > 0, where the last inequality
is implied by lim¹!0 ±
¡
V ¤
` (¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) ¡ V ¤
` (0)
¢
= `.Reputation and Communication 28
is not possible, this model is equivalent to the baseline model of Mailath and
Samuelson (2001) without replacement of types, for which they show that high
e®ort cannot be induced unless discontinuous strategies are allowed (Proposition
2, p424). Our result suggests that pre-trade communication may motivate the
more e±cient type to exert high e®ort by facilitating the learning process in the
market.
We anticipate that our analysis can be extended in other directions as well.
For instance, in the context of internet markets, to examine the e®ect of compe-
tition between trading websites appears as an interesting task from the market
design perspective. Analysis of such competition may also carry implications on
the market segmentation between trading websites and their pricing strategies.
We intend to address these issues in the future.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) If y¤(1) < 1, we would have
V ¤
` (1) = `
¡
1 + ±V ¤
` (1)
¢
+ (1 ¡ `)
¡
y¤(1)(1 + ±V ¤
` (¼¤
Gb(1)) + (1 ¡ y¤(1))±V ¤
` (1)
¢
along with 1 + ±V ¤
` (¼¤
Gb(1)) · ±V ¤
` (¼¤
Bb(1)) = ±V ¤
` (1), whence
V ¤
` (1) · `
¡
1 + ±V ¤
` (1)
¢
+ (1 ¡ `)±V ¤
` (1) = ` + ±V ¤
` (1)
=) V ¤
` (1) · `=(1 ¡ ±) = V ¤
` (0) =) V ¤
` (1) = V ¤
` (0);
i.e., V ¤
` would be constant. Since this would contradict the earlier asserted inequality
1 + ±V ¤
` (¼¤
Gb(1)) · ±V ¤
` (¼¤
Bb(1)), we conclude that y¤(1) = 1.
Next, suppose that lim¹!1 y¤(¹) 6= 1. Then, the following holds for some ´ > 0:
for any ² > 0 there is ¹² < 1 such that 1 ¡ ² < ¹² and y¤(¹²) < 1 ¡ ´ and thus,
V ¤
` (¹²) = `pG(¹²;y¤(¹²)) + ±
¡
`V ¤




Since pG(¹²;y¤(¹²)) ! 1; ¹² ! 1; ¼Gg(¹²) ! 1, and ¼Bb(¹²;y¤(¹²)) ! 1 as ² ! 0,
(28) would imply lim¹!1 V ¤
` (¹) = ` + ± lim¹!1 V ¤
` (¹), i.e., lim¹!1 V ¤
` (¹) = `
1¡± =
V ¤
` (0). Then, V ¤
` (¹) = V ¤
` (0) for all ¹ which would imply that an `-seller with a bad
quality product would always lie as pG(¹²;y¤(¹²)) + ±V ¤
` (0) > ±V ¤
` (0), contradicting
y¤(¹²) < 1. Hence, we conclude that lim¹!1 y¤(¹) = 1.
(ii) Since y¤(¹) > 0 by (i) for all su±ciently large ¹ < 1, we have V ¤
` (¹) =
pG(¹;y¤(¹)) + ± (`V ¤
` (¼Gg(¹)) + (1 ¡ `)V ¤









1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ ` + `2)
(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±`)
:Reputation and Communication 29
(iii) With a view to reach a contradiction, suppose that y¤(¹) < 1 for some ¹, yet
V` < V ¤
` (1). Note that ±(V` ¡ V ¤
` (0)) < 1 from (6).
If ±(V ¤
` (1)¡V ¤
` (0)) > `, then there is some ¹ 2 (0;1) such that ±(V ¤
` (1)¡V ¤
` (0)) >
pG(¹;1) > ±(V`¡V ¤
` (0)) so that y¤(¹) cannot be equal to 1 because ±(V ¤
` (1)¡V ¤
` (0)) >
pG(¹;1), nor can it be less than 1 because ±(V ¤
` (¼Bb(¹;y))¡V ¤
` (0)) < pG(¹;y) for all
y < 1, which is impossible.
If ±(V ¤
` (1) ¡ V ¤
` (0)) · `, on the other hand, y¤(¹) = 1 must hold for all ¹ 2 (0;1]
due to condition (ii) of De¯nition 1, because pG(¹;y) > ` ¸ ±(V ¤
` (1) ¡ V ¤
` (0)) ¸
±(V ¤(¼Bb(¹;y))¡V ¤(¼Gb(¹;y))) for any y. Since y¤(0) = 1 as asserted in (2), we have
encountered a contradiction to the supposition that y¤(¹) < 1 for some ¹:
Therefore, we conclude that V` = V ¤
` (1). This, together with V ¤
` (1) = 1 +
± (`V ¤
` (1) + (1 ¡ `)V ¤
` (¼¤
Gb(1)), implies that V ¤
` (¼¤
Gb(1)) = V ¤
` (0).
(iv) Suppose we reset ¼¤
Gb(1) = 0 in an equilibrium with y¤(¹) ´ 1. The value
function V ¤
h (:) is unchanged, while the incentive compatibility condition for type h at
1 is still veri¯ed: 1+ ±V ¤
h (1) ¸ ±V ¤
h (0) holds if it holds for ¼¤
Gb(1) > 0: For the `-type
seller, the value V ¤
` (1) is lower while V ¤
` (¹) is unchanged for ¹ < 1: But since ¹t = 1
should never occur in equilibrium when the type is `; all incentive compatibility are
preserved. Hence, it still constitutes an equilibrium when ¼¤
Gb(1) is reset at 0. It is
trivial to verify that V` = V ¤
` (1) holds in this equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 7. To reach a contradiction, suppose that there exists ¹ such
that ¼Bb(¹;yV (¹)) · ¹. Since yV is continuous (Lemma 4) and yV (¹) = 1 for ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹,
there exists
~ ¹ = maxf¹ < 1 j ¼Bb(¹;yV (¹)) · ¹g < ¹ ¹: (29)
Note that ¼Bb(~ ¹;yV (~ ¹)) = ~ ¹. Since it is easily veri¯ed from (5) that




it must be the case that yV (~ ¹) = ^ y and thus
pG(~ ¹; ^ y) = ±(V (~ ¹) ¡ V (0)): (31)
Expanding V (¹) = pG(¹;y¤(¹)) + ± (`V (¼Gg(¹)) + (1 ¡ `)V (0)) by applying an
































¹ht + (1 ¡ ¹)`t: (34)Reputation and Communication 30
Note from (34) that ¼t




Gg(~ ¹) by (29). Consequently, yV (¼t
Gg(~ ¹)) > ^ y by (30). Therefore, since pG(¹;y) · 1
and pG(¹;y) decreases in y, (33) implies that




Gg(~ ¹); ^ y) ¡ `)±t`t: (35)
Since
pG(¹; ^ y) =
¹h + (1 ¡ ¹)`
h
(36)
from (3), we further deduce from (35) that








< pG(~ ¹; ^ y) ¡ ` +
1 X
t=1




= pG(~ ¹; ^ y) ¡ ` + (1 ¡ `)
±`
1 ¡ ±`
= pG(~ ¹; ^ y) ¡
(1 ¡ ±)`
1 ¡ ±`
< pG(~ ¹; ^ y)
where the second inequality follows from ¼t
Gg(~ ¹) < 1. Thus, we have reached a
contradictory conclusion that (31) cannot hold at ~ ¹.
Proof of Theorem 1. Proof of existence. De¯ne Fr as the subset of all right-
continuous functions in F, endowed with the topology of the weak convergence. The
set Fr is convex and compact (Theorem 5.1, Billingsley, 1999). By Fan-Glicksberg
Fixed Point Theorem,21 therefore, T has a ¯xed point in Fr if
T(Fr) ½ Fr and T is continuous on Fr. (37)
We now show (37). First note that T(V ) is right-continuous if V is right-
continuous because yV (¹) is continuous in ¹, which proves T(Fr) ½ Fr.
Next, consider a sequence Vn, n = 1;2;¢¢¢, in Fr that weakly converges to V 2
Fr. To prove continuity of T, we show below that T(Vn) weakly converges to T(V ),
i.e., T(Vn)(¹) converges to T(V )(¹) at all continuity points of T(V ) (Theorem 2.1,
Billingsley, 1999).
Let ­ be the set of all points where V (¼Gg(¹)) is continuous. Since ¼Gg(¹) is
increasing, [0;1]n­ is countable. Since V is continuous at ¹ = ¼Gg(¹) if ¹ 2 ­ by
continuity of ¼Gg, it follows that Vn(¼Gg(¹)) converges to V (¼Gg(¹)) on ­.
21This theorem (Fan, 1952; Glicksberg, 1952) states that an upper hemi-continuous con-
vex valued correspondence from a nonempty compact convex subset of a convex Hausdor®
topological vector space has a ¯xed point.Reputation and Communication 31
Next, Let yV (¹) be as de¯ned in (11) for V and yVn(¹) for Vn. Let ¤ be the set of
points where V (¼Bb(¹;yV (¹))) is continuous. Since ¼Bb(¹;yV (¹)) is non-decreasing
on (0;1] as veri¯ed in the proof of Lemma 5, [0;1]n¤ is countable. We now show that
yVn(¹) ! yV (¹) for all ¹ 2 ¤.
Consider ¹ 2 ¤. That yVn(¹) ! yV (¹) is trivial from (11) if ¹ = 0 or ¹ > ¹ ¹.
Hence, suppose 0 < ¹ · ¹ ¹ so that, with V ¡




n (¼Bb(¹;yVn(¹))) ¡ V (0)
¢
· pG(¹;yVn(¹)) · ± (V (¼Bb(¹;yVn(¹))) ¡ V (0)):
(38)
By taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that yVn(¹) converges to a
limit y0. To reach a contradiction, suppose y0 6= yV (¹). First, consider the case that
y0 < yV (¹). Then, since pG(¹;y) decreases with ¹ there exists " > 0 such that
pG(¹;yVn(¹)) > pG(¹;yV (¹)) + " = ±(V (¼Bb(¹;yV (¹))) ¡ V (0)) + "
for su±ciently large n, where the equality follows because ¹ 2 ¤. From this we further
deduce that
pG(¹;yVn(¹)) > ±(Vn(¼Bb(¹;yV (¹))) ¡ V (0)) + "=2
> ±(Vn(¼Bb(¹;yVn(¹))) ¡ V (0)) + "=2
for su±ciently large n, where the ¯rst inequality follows because Vn(¼Bb(¹;yV (¹))) !
V (¼Bb(¹;yV (¹))) for ¹ 2 ¤ and the second because ¼Bb(¹;y) increases in y and
yVn(¹) ! y0 < yV (¹). However, this contradicts (38).
For the case y0 > yV (¹), we can apply the same reasoning using V ¡
n (¼Bb(¹;yVn(¹))) ¸
Vn(¼Bb(¹;yV (¹))) for n large to reach an analogous contradiction:
pG(¹;yVn(¹)) < ±(V ¡
n (¼Bb(¹;yVn(¹))) ¡ V (0)) ¡ "=2:
Hence, we conclude that yVn(¹) ! yV (¹) for all ¹ 2 ¤.
Together with the earlier result that Vn(¼Gg(¹)) ! V (¼Gg(¹)) for all ¹ 2 ­, this
establishes for all ¹ 2 ­ \ ¤ that
T(Vn)(¹) = pG(¹;yVn(¹)) + ±
¡
`Vn(¼Gg(¹)) + (1 ¡ `)V (0)
¢
! pG(¹;yV (¹)) + ±
¡
`V (¼Gg(¹)) + (1 ¡ `)V (0)
¢
= T(V )(¹)
as n ! 1. Finally, to verify this convergence at every continuity point of T(V )(¹),
observe ¯rst that this convergence is trivial from (11) at ¹ = 0;1. For any other
¹ 62 ­ \ ¤ at which T(V ) is continuous, one can ¯nd ¹1 2 ­ \ ¤ \ (0;¹) arbitrarily
close to ¹ and ¹2 2 ­\¤\(¹;1) arbitrarily close to ¹ because ­\¤ is dense in [0;1].
Since T(Vn)(¹1) · T(Vn)(¹) · T(Vn)(¹2) and T(V )(¹1) · T(V )(¹) · T(V )(¹2),
taking the limits we get




T(V )(¹1) = T(V )(¹) = inf
¹22­\¤
¹2>¹
T(V )(¹2);Reputation and Communication 32
which imply, as desired, that T(Vn)(¹) converges to T(V )(¹) at every continuity point
of T(V )(¹). This proves (37), thus completes the proof of existence.
Proof of uniqueness. To reach a contradiction, suppose there are two ¯xed points
V 1 and V 2. Notice that the level ¹ ¹ is independent of V and
V i(¹) = pG(¹;1) + ± (`V (1) + (1 ¡ `)V (0)) 8¹ ¸ ¹ ¹: (39)
Since V 1(¹) = V 2(¹) for all ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹, the following is well-de¯ned:
^ ¹ := minf¹jV 1(¹0) = V 2(¹0) 8¹0 ¸ ¹g 2 (0; ¹ ¹]: (40)
A \segment" for i = 1;2, is a nonempty interval Ii = [x;z] ½ [0; ¹ ¹] such that V i(¹) >
V j(¹) for all ¹ 2 (x;z) and V i(¹) = V j(¹) for ¹ = x;z, where j 6= i. A \region" for
i = 1;2, is a nonempty interval Ri = [x;z] ½ [0; ¹ ¹] such that V i(¹) ¸ V j(¹) for all
¹ 2 Ii and there are x0;z0 2 Ri such that [x;x0] and [z0;z] are segments for i. Let
pi
G(¹) := pG(¹;yV i(¹)) and ¼i
Bb(¹) := ¼Bb(¹;yV i(¹)) for i = 1;2: (41)
Recall that in the proof of Lemma 5, we have shown that both pi
G(¹) and ¼i
Bb(¹)




Bb(¹) strictly increase in ¹.
Next, we establish the following:
[B] If V 1(¼i
Bb(¹)) = V 2(¼i
Bb(¹)) for some ¹ > 0 and some i = 1;2, then y1(¹) =




Bb(¹). If, in addition,
V 1(¼Gg(¹)) = V 2(¼Gg(¹)) holds, then V 1(¹) = V 2(¹).





Bb(¹)) ¡ V i(0)
¢
8¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹]; (42)
V 1(¼i
Bb(¹)) = V 2(¼i
Bb(¹)) implies p1
G(¹) = p2







(¹), from which the remaining claims of [B] follow.
Finally, since ¼i
Bb(^ ¹) > ^ ¹ by Lemma 7 and ¼Gg(^ ¹) > ^ ¹ by (4), due to continuity,
there is ¹0 < ^ ¹ such that V 1(¹0) 6= V 2(¹0), ¼i
Bb(¹0) > ^ ¹ and ¼Gg(¹0) > ^ ¹. Then,
V 1(¼i
Bb(¹0)) = V 2(¼i
Bb(¹0)) by (40) and thus, V 1(¹0) = V 2(¹0) by [B], a contradiction
to the earlier assertion that V 1(¹0) 6= V 2(¹0). This completes the proof of uniqueness,
hence of Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 8. Let Vh(¹) be the value function from the following strategy
of an h-seller: always report q = g truthfully and upon drawing q = b for the ¯rst
time report m = G and get V ¤









h (0)(1 ¡ h)
1 X
t=1
ht±t (43)Reputation and Communication 33
where ¼t
Gg(¹) = ¼Gg(¼t¡1
Gg (¹)) as de¯ned in (34). Clearly, V ¤
h (¹) ¸ Vh(¹):














Subtracting (44) from (43),

























> `, we have
Vh(¹) ¡ V ¤
` (¹) >
±(h ¡ `)`
(1 ¡ ±h)(1 ¡ ±`)
¡
±(1 ¡ ±)(h ¡ `)
(1 ¡ ±h)(1 ¡ ±`)
V ¤
` (0) = 0:
Proof of Theorem 2. By construction the incentive compatibility conditions
are satis¯ed for the `-seller at the unique ¯xed point of T. Moreover, with V ¤
h (0) =
`=(1 ¡ ±) the optimal strategy for an h-seller is to announce m = q if q = g: It su±ces
to show that x¤ (¹;b) = 0 for ¹ > 0:
For ¹ 2 [¹ ¹;1], this follows from (15) because ¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) = 1 and pG(¹;y¤(¹)) ·










` (¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹))) by Lemma 8 while V ¤









Hence, we have proved the optimality of x¤(¹;b) = 0 for ¹ > 0.
We already showed that x¤(0;b) = 1 is optimal with ¼¤
Bb(0) = 0, which completes
description of an NTR-equilibrium. Other NTR-equilibria may exist that di®er in
x¤(0;b) and ¼¤
Bb(0). But since consistency requires that an h-seller starts with an
initial reputation level ¹ > 0 and an h-seller always tells the truth as per property
(a) of NTR-equilibrium, speci¯cation of x¤(0;b) is a part of o®-equilibrium strategy.
Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is unique.














g := fg;bgt¡1 £ fgg is the set of all possible realizations of q for t periods
with the requirement that q = g in period t; ½(ht) is the ex ante probability thatReputation and Communication 34
ht2Ht
g realizes; ¼(ht;¹) is the posterior belief at the beginning of period t calculated
by Bayes rule from the prior belief ¹ along ht. Observe that V ¤
h (¹) is increasing in
¹ because pG(¹;y¤(¹)); ¼Gg(¹) and ¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) all increase in ¹ as veri¯ed earlier.














h (¹) = V o










8¹ > 0: (48)
In conjunction with (32), we have
V o











































































































h(1 ¡ h)(1 ¡ `)
(1 ¡ (1 ¡ h)¹)2 +
h2(h2 ¡ `)(1 ¡ `)`
(`(1 ¡ ¹) + h2¹)2 ; (51)
the derivative of which is
¡2(1 ¡ `)
h(1 ¡ h)2
(1 ¡ (1 ¡ h)¹)3 ¡
`(h3 ¡ h`)2
(`(1 ¡ ¹) + h2¹)3 < 0: (52)Reputation and Communication 35
If h > 1+
p
1+4`2+4`3
2+2` , it is routinely veri¯ed that (51) evaluated at ¹ = 1 is positive and
thus, (51) is positive for all ¹ due to (52). This further implies that (50) is positive








8¹ ¸ ¹ ¹ (53)




Next, let ¹1 = minf¹j¼Gg(¹) ¸ ¹ ¹ and ¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) ¸ ¹ ¹g and consider ¹ 2 [¹1; ¹ ¹].
Note that ¹1 < ¹ ¹ due to Lemma 7. Since
V ¤
h (¹) = hpG(¹;y¤(¹)) + ±
¡
hV ¤





` (¹) = pG(¹;y¤(¹)) + ±
¡
`V ¤










d¹ , which exists almost everywhere because both V ¤
h (¹)
and V ¤































Setting ¼Bb(0;1) = lim¹!0 ¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)) and V ¤
h (0) = lim¹!0 V ¤
h (¹), this implies
that h-seller prefers to tell the truth upon drawing q = b whenever `-seller is indi®erent,
i.e., when ¹ 2 (0; ¹ ¹]. Then, x¤(0;b) = 0 is optimal by continuity of V ¤
h , pG(¹;y¤(¹)),
¼Gg(¹), and ¼Bb(¹;y¤(¹)). Finally, optimality of x¤(¹;g) = 0 follows immediately
from (13) as before.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since ±¢vo < ±¢ < 1, as before there is ¹ ¹y 2 (0; ¹ ¹)
such that pG(¹ ¹y;1) = ±(V
y
vo(¼Bb(¹ ¹y;1))¡vo) so that pG(¹;y) > ±(V
y
vo(¼Bb(¹;y))¡vo)
for all y 2 [0;1] and, therefore, y
y
vo(¹) = 1 for all ¹ ¸ ¹ ¹y.
Note that y
y
vo is continuous by construction (which is analogous to (11)) and
y
y






























` (~ ¹) ¡ V ¤
` (0) = V y
vo(~ ¹) ¡ vo where ~ ¹ := ¼Bb(¹0;y¤
V ¤
` (¹0)) > ¹0 (54)
and the inequality is from Lemma 7. Furthermore, since
V ¤
` (~ ¹) = pG(~ ¹;y¤
V ¤
` (~ ¹)) + ±
¡
`V ¤





vo(~ ¹) = pG(~ ¹;yy
vo(~ ¹)) + ±
¡
`V y
vo(¼Gg(~ ¹)) + (1 ¡ `)vo
¢
(56)Reputation and Communication 36
while pG(~ ¹;y¤
V ¤
` (~ ¹)) ¸ pG(~ ¹;y
y










vo(¼Gg(~ ¹)) ¡ vo
¢¤
· (± ¡ 1)
¡





` (1) ¡ V ¤
` (0) = ¢ > ¢vo = V
y
vo(1) ¡ vo, there must exist ¹00 2 (~ ¹;1) such
that V ¤
` (¹00) ¡ V ¤
` (0) · V
y
vo(¹00) ¡ vo and V ¤
` (¹) ¡ V ¤
` (0) > V
y
vo(¹0) ¡ vo for all ¹ > ¹00.
However, since pG(¹0;y¤
V ¤
` (¹00)) ¸ pG(¹0;y
y
vo(¹00)) and ¼Gg(¹00) > ¹0, (55) and (56)
evaluated at ¹ = ¹00 imply that V ¤
` (¹00) ¡ ±V ¤
` (0) > V
y
vo(¹00) ¡ ±vo and consequently,
V ¤
` (¹00) ¡ V ¤
` (0) > V
y
vo(¹00) ¡ vo, contradicting the de¯nition of ¹00.
Proof of Lemma 9. Since continuity under the sup norm requires uniform conver-
gence, the possibility of a ¯xed point having unbounded derivative poses a potential
problem. The bulk of the proof evolves around how to circumvent this problem. We
start with two preliminary lemmas asserting that p¤
G(¹) is of bounded variation on




Lemma A1 For any " > 0 there exists M" > 0 such that 8vo 2 [ `
1¡±; 1
1¡±); 8V 2
Fvo \ C[0;1]; 8¹ and ¹0 2 ("; ¹ ¹y),
pG(¹0;y
y





Proof. Note from (3) that we can ¯nd k > 0 such that
@pG
@¹ > 0 is bounded above
uniformly by k; and
@pG
@y < 0 is bounded below uniformly by ¡k. Suppose ¹ < ¹0
without loss of generality.
If y
y








¹0¡¹ < k because pG decreases in y,
proving (58).
Now suppose that y
y
V (¹0) < y
y




(1 ¡ h)(1 ¡ `)(1 ¡ y)





(1 ¡ h)(1 ¡ `)(1 ¡ ¹)¹
[¹(1 ¡ h) + (1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ `)(1 ¡ y)]
2 > ~ k"










V (¹0)) ¡ ¼Bb(¹;y
y













using the facts that y
y
V (¹0) < y
y
V (¹) and ¹ < ¹0, and consequently,
y
y
V (¹0) ¡ y
y










V (¹0)) ¡ pG(¹;y
y





































if ¹ > "; (59)
where V
y
vo is the ¯xed point of Tvo.
Proof. For given vo there exists ¹ > 0 de¯ned by V
y













vo(¼Gg(¹)) + (1 ¡ `)vo
´
if ¹ ¸ ¹:
(60)
To reach a contradiction, suppose that for any K > 0 one can ¯nd ¹1 > " such that
D+V
y





(60) would imply that ¹1 > ¹ when K is su±ciently large and that one can construct a
sequence ¹n ! 1 where ¹n = ¼Gg(¹n¡1). Since there is ¿ < 1 such that ¼¿
Gg(¹) > ¹ ¹y




arbitrarily large. But, this is impossible because D+V
y
vo(¹) is bounded for ¹ > ¹ ¹y as












a formula adapted from (44) for V
y
vo(¹) for ¹ > ¹ ¹y. Hence, we conclude that D+V
y
vo(¹)
is uniformly bounded for ¹ > " and thus, (58) and (60) imply
D+V y



















for ¹ > ". Thus, D+V
y
vo(¹) · M"
1¡±h if ¹ > ". u
Next, choose vo 2 ( `
1¡±; 1
1¡±). Notice that for a su±ciently small ´ > 0; in
particular smaller than vo¡ `





vo := [vo¡´·v·vo+´Fv. As an intermediate step, we needReputation and Communication 38




vo \ C[0;1] ! C[0;1] is continuous in sup norm. (62)
Proof. Consider V;V 0 2 F
´
vo \ C[0;1] such that max¹2[0;1] jV 0(¹) ¡ V (¹)j < ². Since
y
y
V (¹) and y
y
V 0(¹) are, by construction, the solutions to
pG(¹;y) = ±
¡
maxfvo;V (¼Bb(¹;y))g ¡ vo
¢
(63)





². From (21), therefore, we deduce that
max
¹2[0;1]
jTvo(V 0)(¹) ¡ Tvo(V )(¹)j < ² + ±²;
which establishes (62). u
Given vo 2 ( `
1¡±; 1
1¡±) and ´ small as speci¯ed above, consider small j·j < ´=2 and




vo+·\C[0;1]. By (63), the value of pG(¹;y
y
V (¹)) di®ers when calculated
for Tvo and when calculated for Tvo+·, and the di®erence is at most ±·. Thus, from
(21),
Tvo(V )(¹) ¡ 2j±·j · Tvo+·(V )(¹) · Tvo(V )(¹) + 2j±·j 8¹ 2 [0;1]: (64)
In particular, observe that
Tvo(V
y







Finally, to prove continuity of Ã at vo, we decompose the argument into two parts:
First, we prove uniform convergence of functions Ã(vo +·) = V
y
vo+· to Ã(vo) = V
y
vo as
· ! 0 on intervals [";1], then do the same separately on [0;2"]. The continuity will
be established by combining the two parts.
We know from Lemma A2 that on the interval [";1]; the function V
y
vo+· is K"-
Liptchitz where K" = M"
1¡±h: Then from Ascoli-Arzelµ a Theorem (see Royden (1988)),
the subset consisting of all K"-Lipschitz function of F
´
vo is compact under the sup
norm. Hence, there exists a sequence of ¯xed points V
y
vo+· such that, when restricted
to the domain [";1], it converges as · ! 0 to a limit, denoted by W
[";1]
vo , where W
[";1]
vo












vo+· restricted on [";1] and let e V
y[";1]
vo+· denote the continuous
linear extension of V
y[";1]













vo+·)(¹): (65)Reputation and Communication 39
Note that Tvo(lim·!0 e V
y[";1]
vo+·)(¹) for each ¹ is fully determined by lim·!0 e V
y[";1]
vo+· re-







vo+· on [";1] by de¯nition, therefore, (c0) and (65) imply that
Tvo(f W[";1]
vo )(¹) · f W[";1]
vo (¹) · Tvo(f W[";1]
vo )(¹) for all ¹ 2 [";1];
where f W
[";1]
vo is the continuous linear extension of W
[";1]
vo on [0;"]. Since " > 0 is
arbitrary and V
y
vo is the only function V that satis¯es Tvo(V )(¹) = V (¹) on [";1] for





on [";1], i.e., W
[";1]
vo coincides with V
y






vo under the sup norm on [";1] for any " > 0:
Note, however, that this is not su±cient for uniform convergence on [0;1]. Hence,
choose ¸ ¹ > 0 such that V
y
vo(¼Gg(¸ ¹)) < vo: Then, because V
y
vo+· converges to V
y
vo under
the sup norm on [
¸ ¹
2;1] by (c1), we have V
y
vo+·(¼Gg(¸ ¹)) < vo + · for su±ciently small
·. But this implies that V
y
vo+·(¼Gg(¹)) < vo + · for all ¹ · ¸ ¹ for su±ciently small ·,
and consequently, V
y
vo+·(¹) = pG(¹;1)+±(vo+·) on [0; ¸ ¹], which converges uniformly
to V
y






vo under the sup norm on [0; ¸ ¹]:
Combining (c1) and (c2), we obtain uniform convergence under the sup norm on
the entire domain [0;1], which proves continuity of Ã at vo.
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